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Decentralization and Infrastructure
in Developing Countries:
Reconciling Principles and Practice
Roy Bahl and Richard Bird
Abstract
The paper first sets out the theory of expenditure assignment with respect to
decentralizing infrastructure expenditure, and then considers how practice around
the developing world appears to differ from what that theory appears to suggest.
We suggest several ways in which theory and practice might be brought closer
together. The most important is simply to begin by taking a more comprehensive
approach to infrastructure reform in countries in which much such investment is,
properly, at the subnational level. Two critical preconditions for effectively
decentralizing investment are, first, clear assignment of infrastructure
responsibilities and, second, effective local government accountability. Neither
condition is now satisfied in many developing countries. One key reason is that
few countries have developed appropriate and adequate local government revenue
systems. Although much attention has been paid to financing infrastructure
through borrowing and public-private partnerships (PPP), and such approaches
may have important roles to play in developing adequate infrastructure in some
countries, they can neither substitute for a sound local revenue system nor realize
their full potential in the absence of such a system. In addition, since local
governments are seldom equal in fiscal or economic terms as a rule, effectively
decentralizing infrastructure requires the careful development of different
(asymmetric) approaches for different sizes and types of subnational government
structures.
Keywords: decentralization, expenditure assignment, infrastructure investment,
borrowing, public-private partnerships
JEL codes: H72, H77, O21, O23, R53
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Decentralization and Infrastructure in Developing Countries:
Reconciling Principles and Practice
1. Introduction
This paper reviews the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the
decentralization of responsibility for infrastructure to local governments, with
particular emphasis on local governments in developing countries. The focus is on
structural issues rather than day-to-day management issues: the latter are
important but even the best management is unlikely to produce the best possible
results if the structure of local governance and finance is flawed. We begin by
setting out the theory of expenditure assignment with respect to decentralizing
infrastructure expenditure, and then consider how practice around the developing
world appears to differ from what that theory appears to suggest. In the balance of
the paper, we suggest several ways in which theory and practice might be brought
closer together. The most important is simply to begin by taking a more
comprehensive approach to infrastructure reform in countries in which much of
such investment is, properly, at the subnational level. Two critical preconditions for
effectively decentralizing investment are, first, clear assignment of infrastructure
responsibilities and, second, effective local government accountability. Neither
condition is now satisfied in many developing countries. One key reason is that
few countries have developed appropriate and adequate local government revenue
systems. Although much attention has been paid to financing infrastructure
through borrowing and public-private partnerships (PPP), and such approaches
may have important roles to play in developing adequate infrastructure in some
countries, they can neither substitute for a sound local revenue system nor realize
their full potential in the absence of such a system. In addition, since local
governments are seldom equal in fiscal or economic terms as a rule, effectively
decentralizing infrastructure requires the careful development of different
(asymmetric) approaches for different sizes and types of subnational government
structures.
According to the standard economic theory of expenditure assignment, under
the right circumstances, certain services and the infrastructure needed to provide
them can be more efficiently provided by subnational governments than national
governments. In industrial countries, infrastructure investment is indeed
decentralized to a significant extent (Estache and Sinha 1995). In OECD countries,
even big projects, such as ports and airports, are often locally managed and funded
(Bel and Fageda 2009). In the European Union, for example, the share of
subnational investment in economic infrastructure is 60 to 70 percent in the older
member states and 40 percent in the new member states; subnational shares in
social investments (e.g., in schools and hospitals) are even higher (Kappeler et al.
2012).
In low- and middle-income countries, however, economic theory provides less
guidance for best practices. This is mostly because the assumptions underpinning
–2–
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Table 1. Public Investment and Decentralization in Latin America
Country

Argentina
Colombia
Chile
Peru

General
government
investment
(% GDP)

Subnational
government
investment
(% GDP)

1.3
1.9
1.4
2.4

1.1
1.3
0.2
1.2

Subnational
General
as share of government
total (%)
taxes
(% GDP)
84.6
68.4
14.3
50.0

30.8
15.9
19.6
17.4

Subnational Subnational
own
as share of
revenues
total (%)
(% GDP)
5.6
2.9
1.5
0.8

18.2
18.2
7.6
5.0

Sources and notes: Investment (average acquisition of fixed capital on accrual basis; data for 1995–
2006) from de Mello 2012; revenue (for 2008 only) from Gomez Sabaini and Jímenez 2012.

the decentralization model do not fit the developing country setting as well. The
result is a great deal of variation in the extent to which responsibility for
infrastructure service delivery is assigned to local governments (Alm 2010). In the
countries listed in Table 1, for instance, the equivalent of a large share of
subnational own revenue is devoted to infrastructure. In fact, the amount spent on
infrastructure by subnational governments in Peru is greater than the amount they
raise from own sources.
Even in those developing countries in which subnational governments are
important investors in infrastructure, it is by no means obvious whether
expenditures on infrastructure have been over-assigned or under-assigned to such
governments, or whether the right expenditures have been devolved.1 The open
question is whether a change in governance arrangements (or in the incentives to
policy-makers that lie beneath these governance arrangements) would lead to an
improvement in the delivery of infrastructure services.2 The institutional
arrangements in question include not only the structure of subnational
governments, but also the nature of political representation, spending and revenue
mobilization powers, borrowing restrictions and practices, the degree of autonomy
in management, the design and implementation of intergovernmental transfer
systems, and the accountability of governments at all levels to those for whom they
presumably speak.
1. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many questions have been raised about the
relationship between decentralization and public investment in a time of increasing
budgetary pressure. A useful recent survey of this literature may be found in Fernandez Llera
(2012), but we do not discuss the issue here.
2. For example, Afonso, Araujo, and Junior (2005) argue with respect to Brazil that “the
shortage of investment in infrastructure is even more serious when we consider that an
increasing, and already the major, part of expenditure on capital formation by public sector
authorities has become decentralized… Institutionally, these regional governments do not
have the competence to concede, regulate, or carry out functions in the majority of actions
and services that are classified as infrastructure related (with the exception of sanitation).”
–3–

Roy Bahl and Richard Bird

In Section 2 of this paper, we define what we mean by “decentralization” and
“infrastructure,” discuss normative principles that guide the assignment of
responsibility for delivering infrastructure services, and note how the practice
observed in most countries deviates from what theory appears to suggest. Section
3 considers a number of ways in which theory and practice might be better
reconciled, emphasizing in particular the need to consider the broader governance
context of each country. Section 4 briefly deals with two special “asymmetrical”
issues of importance in many developing countries: infrastructure provision in
metropolitan and remote rural areas, and regional equity. Section 5 concludes with
a summary of the policy directions suggested by this review.
2. Infrastructure and Expenditure Assignment
Though the term “infrastructure” is commonly used in the development
economics literature, it is not always defined, and can take on different meanings.
The term “public infrastructure investment,” for instance, is sometimes used to
denote government investment, even though it also includes investment by
publicly owned companies such as utilities. As a rule, however, such corporate
investment is recorded as government (rather than corporate) investment only if
the revenues of such firms cover less than half their production costs: that is, the
source of funding, not the formal ownership, determines how investment is
classified (Alegre et al. 2008). More important for the present argument,
“infrastructure investment” itself is sometimes used broadly to include not only
physical capital formation, but also expenditure in areas considered to increase
human capital, for example, education. Even excluding such expenditure, it is
often useful to think of government capital formation as falling into several distinct
categories.
Alegre et al. (2008), for example, distinguish four categories in terms of the
functions served by such investment: (1) Redistribution (housing, recreation,
social protection), (2) Public Goods (defence, environment, order and safety,
general public services), (3) Hospitals and Schools (health and education), and
what they call simply (4) Infrastructure, that is traditional public works projects,
of which transportation is by far the most important in quantitative terms in most
countries. As they argue:
This type of government investment [public works] has the most direct
economic impact by reducing firms’ production and transaction costs.
The economic impact of government investment in health and
education sectors is more long-term and less direct in character, as it
facilitates the building up and maintenance of the economy’s stock of
human capital. Investment in public goods affects the economy’s
allocative efficiency indirectly through framework conditions for
productive activity. Finally, redistribution affects the economy’s income
distribution rather than allocative or productive efficiency per se (Alegre
et al. 2008, 26-27).
–4–
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Although one may quibble with some of these statements, this classification is
nonetheless useful in that it distinguishes clearly between investments that have
direct and indirect effects on the level and nature of economic activity. It also
indicates that the most relevant government investment usually takes the form of
“network” investment (e.g., transportation and communication) rather than
“point” investment (e.g., hospitals, administrative buildings), even though the
former is also geographically specific in its location and the latter may often also
be part of a network from some perspectives (e.g., primary health centres feeding
into hospitals or elementary schools into secondary schools).
For the most part, the focus in this paper is on the narrower definition of
infrastructure investment as the construction, operation, and maintenance of the
long-lived physical assets required to deliver such specific public services as land
transportation (highways, roads, streets, bridges, and ancillary services such as
street lighting, street cleaning, signage, etc.), potable water (supply, distribution),
wastewater management (sewerage, disposal), and solid waste collection and
disposal (including hazardous waste).3 Much of the discussion—for example, with
respect to public-private partnerships—may also apply to other “utility” services,
such as electric power generation and distribution, natural gas distribution,
airports and airways, ports and navigation control systems, railroads and public
transit systems, irrigation, telecommunications, and other types of investment
mentioned by Alegre et al. (2008). For the most part in this paper, however, we
focus on the simplest, most basic and arguably most important infrastructure
investments usually assigned to decentralized governments—roads, water and
sewerage, and solid waste disposal.4 Since infrastructure investments are, by
definition, located in a particular physical location within one or more specific
3.The International Monetary Fund Government Financial Statistics data that underlie Table
1 define capital investment as the acquisition of physical assets with a useful life longer than
one year, as well as improvements or rehabilitation that extend the life of the asset (Jacobs
2009). However, this definition does not include the maintenance expenditure needed to
keep the asset functioning during its life, let alone the operating expenditure needed to use
the asset. Assigning responsibility for maintenance to one level of government and for
maintenance of “new investment” to another, as is often done, creates a serious moral hazard
and is almost guaranteed to yield less than optimal results. The line between “maintenance”
and “rehabilitation,” like that between “operation” and “maintenance,” is often hard to draw,
but the fact is that not only are both operating and maintenance expenditure (O&M)
essential for the delivery of public services, but such expenditure is usually considerably
larger over the life of an asset than its initial capital cost (Estache 2010). For the most part,
we shall therefore treat O&M directly related to using physical assets as part of
“infrastructure investment”: a broken water pipe, even if it was acquired yesterday, is not one
that is going to deliver the right amount of water in the right quality to the right places.
4. Although, for expositional purposes, we often label decentralized governments “local,”
there are usually two (regional, local) and sometimes more levels of decentralized
government. We discuss later a few aspects of the important distinction, and relations,
between different levels of subnational government.
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political jurisdictions, even with this restricted set of activities much the same wide
range of factors must be considered as with a broader definition.
The term “fiscal decentralization” also requires definition. In this paper, we
interpret decentralization to mean the devolution of explicit authority and
responsibility for a specific activity to a specific unit of government. Even this
definition is both too broad and too narrow for our purposes, however. It is too
broad in the sense that the assignment of a particular discretionary power to a level
of government is almost never simply a matter of drawing lines between broad
classes of activity such as “water and sewers” and “education” and assigning each
exclusively to one level of government. As discussed below, each activity or
function can be and usually is “unbundled” in a number of ways. At the same time,
defining decentralization as simply equivalent to devolution is also too narrow
because it excludes much of the important infrastructure investment undertaken
by decentralized governments engaged in delivering delegated services such as
health and education. Although our principal focus here is on the provision of
physical infrastructure (including operations and maintenance) by subnational
governments, inevitably some of the specific instances to which we refer and some
of the arguments we make will stretch these boundaries to varying extents.

2.1 The basic rule of expenditure assignment: Efficiency
The basic rule of efficient expenditure assignment is to devolve each function to
the lowest level of government consistent with its efficient performance. This
idea is expressed in the “decentralization theorem” (Oates 1972). So long as
there are local variations in tastes and costs, there are potential efficiency gains
from assigning responsibility for public-sector activities to the lowest level of
government possible. Under such an arrangement, local decision-makers act
on behalf of voters to decide what services are provided, to whom, and in
what quantity and quality. The apt phrase is that “people get what they want”
under a decentralized system, with the result that overall public welfare is
enhanced. A well-known example of this principle is that of “subsidiarity” in
the European Union.5
For some expenditure functions, however, assignment to the lowest level of
government does not lead to a welfare gain, for two main reasons: the presence of
externalities and economies of scale. Although there are other ways to deal with
such problems (such as intergovernmental transfers and private contracting),
either might cause one to favour more centralized infrastructure spending,
especially because many infrastructure projects are expensive, capital-intensive,
and characterized by spillover effects.
Nonetheless, as Table 1 illustrates, in at least some developing countries, a
large proportion of capital expenditures are made by subnational governments.
5. For an interesting comparison of the decentralization theorem and the subsidiarity
principle, see Breton, Cassone, and Fraschini (1998).
–6–
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One explanation might be the importance placed on satisfying local preferences.
Another might be that fiscal centralization is not the only way to deal with
economies of scale and spillover effects or other commonly cited pro-centralization
factors, such as corruption or administrative capacity. Yet another explanation
might be that there are overwhelming political economy considerations (e.g.,
regional equity concerns) for decentralizing more infrastructure investment than
the conventional fiscal federalism literature might suggest.
One way around the assignment problems that arise when externalities or
economies of scale are present is unbundling. This involves breaking the
delivery of a function down into its subcomponents so that the most appropriate
assignment can be made to local governments. For example, expenditures can
be disaggregated by sectors (e.g., education, health), services (e.g., primary
curative care, primary education), or activities (e.g., policy and standards,
planning, asset creation, operation, and maintenance and operation). The World
Bank (2007) has proposed unbundling service responsibilities for rural local
governments in India by cross-classifying activities against sectors and services.
The result of such an approach is to provide clarity in expenditure assignment
and also to provide constituents with a clearer idea of whom to hold
accountable for what service.
Boadway and Shah (2009) take a similar approach. In their schema—outlined
in Table 2—only water, sewer, refuse, and fire protection are assigned to local
governments, with local control over such local infrastructure (roads, water,
sewage, irrigation) likely to be “more cost-effective as well as more suited to the
needs of the users” (147). In addition, although their enthusiasm for public
enterprises in general is restrained, Boadway and Shah (2009) recognize that local
control over public enterprises providing local utility and transportation services is
also appropriate, provided the users are also local (148).
Even in principle, however, matters are complicated, for two reasons. First, as
already mentioned, responsibilities for some services are often shared between
different levels of government (national, state, and local). As Table 2 shows, in the
Boadway-Shah presentation such sharing is deemed appropriate not only with
respect to police, highways, parks and recreation, education, health, and social
welfare, but also even broader policy areas such as fiscal policy, regulation, and
natural resources as well as—interestingly—direct foreign investment. Second,
“responsibility” may be thought of in several different ways: (Level 1)
responsibility for policy, standards and oversight, (Level 2) responsibility for
provision (financing) and administration, and (Level 3) responsibility for
production and administration. To some extent, shared responsibility among levels
of government may be divided along these lines. With respect to primary and
secondary education, for example, it is not uncommon for a national Ministry of
Education to be responsible for determining national standards to be met by
schools, teachers, and students, while regional (state) governments have the
primary responsibility for financing education, and local (municipal) governments
–7–
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Table 2. The Traditional Theory of Infrastructure Expenditure Assignment: An Illustration
Function

Water, sewer, refuse,
fire protection

Policy,
Provision,
standards, administration
oversight

Production,
distribution

Comments

L

L

L,P

Primarily local benefits

S,L

S,L

S,L

Primarily local benefits

Parks and recreation

N,S,L

N,S,L

N,S,L

Benefits and
costs vary in scope

Highways, roads

N,S,L

N,S,L

S,L,P

Benefits and
costs vary in scope

Education, health,
social welfare

N,S,L

S,L

S,L,P

Transfers in kind

Natural resources

N

N,S,L

N,S,L,P

Promotes regional
equity, common market

Fiscal policy

N

N,S,L

N,S,L,P

Coordination possible

N

N,S,L

N,S,L,P

N,L

L

P

Police

Regulation
Foreign direct
investment

Internal common market
Local infrastructure
critical

Source and Notes: Extracted (including comments) from Boadway and Shah 2009, 134-35.
N=national government, S=state (provincial, regional) government, L=local government,
P=private or non-governmental.

(or special school authorities) are in charge of delivering education. In Chile, for
instance, although municipal governments deliver both basic health services and
primary and secondary education, these services are largely financed by the
national government, which is also responsible for ensuring that minimum
national standards are met in all municipalities.
Applying this line of thinking to the project cycle commonly associated with
infrastructure investment, one might end up placing the policy responsibility for
ensuring that appropriate technical standards are met with one level of
government, the primary regulatory (and likely some financing) responsibility
with another, and the responsibility for actually delivering such services with a
third. In the case of water, sewerage, and refuse collection, for example, one level
of government might have responsibility for project design and management of
water quality and waste disposal projects, another level of government with
making provision for adequate water quality and quantity as well as
environmentally sound wastewater and disposal services, and a third with
operating the delivery system, including waste collection and disposal, and
maintenance of the water-sewer infrastructure. In their attempt to develop a
general framework, Boadway and Shah (2009) argue for the assignment of water,
sewer, refuse, and fire protection entirely to local governments (the lowest level)
–8–
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but suggest that responsibility for policy and service delivery for other expenditure
functions should be divided among governments as illustrated in Table 2.6
In practice, the unbundling of expenditure responsibility differs from country
to country. Expenditure unbundling is common, but not a foolproof solution to the
assignment problem. Most countries provide a central and a local government list
of service responsibilities, sometimes in great detail. However, there often is a
concurrent list that makes matters murky. The result can be overlap and confusion
about who is responsible for what. For example, rural local government welfare
programs in Karnataka state in India are overlapped by eight central government
programs and 47 state government programs (Rao, Nath, and Vani 2004).
Three aspects of this brief summary of the traditional approach deserve close
attention. First, the argument for local control depends not only on the
beneficiaries being local, as emphasized in Table 2, but also on those exercising
local control being more likely to meet local needs and, ideally, on local users’
ability and willingness to pay the costs. Only when local governance institutions
ensure in an accountable way that those who benefit and pay are also those who
decide what is done should all aspects of infrastructure decisions be assigned to
local governments. Strictly earmarked user-charge financing (including an
appropriate intertemporal dimension) meets this standard, but general fund
financing, even if entirely local, will do so only when governance institutions are
both strong and fully accountable. Many developing countries do not have such
institutions—or perhaps, in some cases, may have conflicting local institutions
(e.g., traditional, appointed, and elected officials)—so even when all benefits of
public-sector activity are realized (and even paid for) locally, it is not always as
clear as the conventional approach suggests that all aspects of the provision of such
services are necessarily best provided locally.
Second, with respect to the important “shared” infrastructure responsibilities
included in Table 2, the appropriate local component depends on clearly
understanding who benefits, by how much, and when—and again, it is critical to
tie together the financing and expenditure sides of the infrastructure budget
(including operations and maintenance). Not only does this require careful
consideration of spillovers or externalities (network, interurban, etc.), but there
must be adequate horizontal and vertical coordination, cooperation, and burdensharing among affected jurisdictions. Similar concerns often arise even with critical
aspects of “local” activities such as water, sewers, and refuse disposal as well as
“point” investments such as new schools or health centres. Few developing
countries are likely to satisfy these conditions, so the guidance provided by theory
may not always be as clear as the traditional literature suggests.
6.They recognize, of course, that in some cases it may be more efficient to contract out many
aspects of the construction and management of projects as well as service delivery itself to
private providers, although such contracting may increase the regulatory—and perhaps, in
some instances, even the financial—burden on the relevant governments.
–9–
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Infrastructure projects can never be lumped in one group and treated
symmetrically and in the same way. Even with respect to economic infrastructure,
for instance, big projects such as intercity highways are quite different from small
ones such as village-to-market roads, not only in scale and complexity of design
(as well as the need to fit the project within a national perspective), but also in
financing, execution, and operation (maintenance). Small “purely local” projects
can and should be left primarily to local decision-makers to decide on and to fund
(including funding from general transfers and borrowing). The latitude for error
(e.g., corruption) may be greater with such small projects, but the consequences of
such errors are (and should be) largely borne by those who make them. Much the
same may be true with respect to “point” projects such as the design and location
of a particular health centre or school. Mistakes can and will be made; so long as
those who make them bear the costs, they have a strong incentive to get it right.
Large network projects, on the other hand, both because of their broader
externality effects and because of the sheer magnitude of their technical and
financial demands, usually require both support and guidance either from higher
levels of government or from cooperating jurisdictions at the same level (although
the appropriate design of such intergovernmental agreements is beyond the scope
of this paper).
Third, even with respect to purely local infrastructure, localities require an
ample tax base or ample access to capital markets or both to assemble the lump
sums needed for most infrastructure projects. By definition, infrastructure has an
important temporal dimension and capital financing must be timed and provided
in the right way if the right projects are to be carried out in the right places. This
is true even when in principle it should be solely local governments that decide
what is “right,” albeit perhaps subject to standards of quality, quantity, and access
established by higher levels of government and presumably also to monitoring and
evaluation by them. Once again, few developing countries provide a promising
environment for the effective implementation of such ideas.
The solution of the assignment problem with respect to infrastructure
decentralization, as suggested in the traditional literature, is thus simple in
principle but considerably more complex in practice. The simple principle is what
is sometimes called “subsidiarity.” Decentralized provision of the infrastructure
needed to fulfil local expenditure responsibilities should clearly be the
responsibility of local governments. In some instances, restructuring subnational
government borders or reassigning functions to different levels of subnational
government may help achieve efficient decentralization. In others, the most
efficient way to proceed may be establishing some sort of “special district,”
although, as noted below, the effective governance and operation of such specialpurpose governmental units can be surprisingly difficult to resolve (Berry 2009).
An additional complication arises because, in principle, since capital assets
usually provide services over long periods, the most efficient and equitable way to
finance such infrastructure is often through borrowing. However, in practice in
most developing countries, local borrowing is subject to various regulatory and
– 10 –
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quantitative restraints, especially when combined with the less developed capital
markets in most countries. Much local infrastructure thus ends up being financed
by capital grants (or subsidized loans) from higher levels of government, or even
by foreign donors.
More broadly, one cannot consider decentralization and infrastructure in
isolation from the critical issues raised in the “second-generation” fiscal federalism
literature with respect to decentralized governance in general (Oates 2005;
Weingast 2009). As this literature shows, local responsibility and accountability is
crucial in any decentralization program if it is to be compatible with incentives.
Without good local governance in a good intergovernmental system, local
provision of infrastructure is likely to be far from the theoretical ideal. The
appropriate long-term solution is not, however, to shift responsibility to levels of
government that are unlikely to deliver anything better—and may even, from the
perspective of local consumers, do worse—but to improve local governance
institutions by establishing workable and meaningful local accountability by
fiscally responsible governments. To do this, local governments need to have
control over adequate resources for which they are fully accountable to those who
provide them, whether local citizens through user charges and local taxes
(including those servicing capital debts), or higher levels of government that
provide grants or subsidized loans, or private financial institutions that provide
infrastructure loans. Even if decentralization is perfectly designed, some failures—
breakdowns of service delivery, payment arrears, even extreme insolvency—may
occur, so that there is always a need not only for the central government to
maintain a sound macroeconomic framework (e.g., with respect to subnational
borrowing) but also to develop and, if necessary, implement, the equivalent of a
“bankruptcy” takeover of failed local governments.
The requisite balance between assigning expenditure responsibilities to a
decentralized governance institution that is just large enough to encompass the
immediately relevant externalities while at the same time taking adequately into
account the interests of all those affected (e.g., those in the areas where the refuse
is dumped, buried, or burned) rather than just the interests of such specific groups
as shareholders or public-sector workers is not easy to attain. Finding an
expenditure delivery arrangement that passes this test becomes even more difficult
when it becomes necessary to align “who pays” with “who benefits.”
Two other factors drive a wedge between the theory of assigning infrastructure
responsibility and the practice. One is the inherent complication of the matter.
Imagine trying to unbundle education expenditures into various activities, and
then developing an operating definition of an activity such as “standard setting.”
And then there are requirements that the benefit zone for certain infrastructure
services be defined. Finally, there is politics. Unbundling may be a good idea for
finding the right level of government to deliver a service, but elected politicians
may be loath to give up control and may impose new mandates in the name of
more efficient infrastructure service delivery.
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2.2 From principle to practice
The traditional assignment of expenditure responsibility suggests that much of the
spending on infrastructure will be made by local governments. Worldwide, about
one billion people lack clean water and perhaps three billion lack access to adequate
sanitation facilities. In principle, the annual infrastructure expenditure required to
meet this one local need has been estimated at 2.0 percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan
Africa and 1.7 percent in South Asia, with about 40 percent of these amounts
required for new investment and the balance for operation and maintenance
(Estache 2010). In practice, however, as Table 1 suggests for some Latin American
countries, total local expenditures on all infrastructure have sometimes been less
than these levels, and the share financed from “own” revenues is smaller.
It is not surprising that in practice, new investments made in even the most
local of infrastructure in poor countries are largely financed by foreign aid and
capital transfers. Indeed, in many cases local “ability to pay” is so low that even
recurrent operating and maintenance expenditures, when made at all, are
sometimes financed from such outside sources.7
A major obstacle in the way of assigning more responsibility for infrastructure
to local governments is that most local governments in developing countries lack
the financial, managerial, and technical ability to do the job. Two solutions seem
possible: kick it all upstairs to a higher-level government, or work away at the long,
grinding process of building up local governance structures and managerial
capacity. It is always quicker and easier to outsource tasks (e.g., through publicprivate partnerships) than to build up the institutional structure to enable local
people to do the job themselves. Given the short time horizons under which aid
agencies and national governments operate, they usually choose the easy way. In
Bangladesh, for example, the national Local Engineering Department essentially
centralized local investment. Although centralization probably improved the
technical efficiency of projects and was usually enthusiastically supported by local
governments glad to be freed of the need to tax their own people, following this
path meant that local autonomy was significantly undermined. The result is that
(1) local people have little or no ownership in the asset, so they tend to run it down
rather than maintain it properly, (2) they still lack most of the capacities needed to
do it right anyway, (3) the asset provided may not be what local people really want,
and (4) the whole cycle is likely to continue as long as outsiders are willing to pay.
A similar system of centrally controlled infrastructure investment existed in
Indonesia during the 1970–2000 period. However, this was replaced with a
decentralized system in 2000, and the responsibility for choosing and
implementing infrastructure projects began to shift to elected local governments.
Preferences
Preferences for capital projects will vary across regions within a country because of
differences in the economic base, differences in the existing quality of
7.When provincial or state governments are removed from this calculation, the vertical
imbalance observed in most countries is larger.
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infrastructure services, and differences related to urban population densities. The
idea that local familiarity and information can lead to better project selection and
implementation is both generally accepted and supported by some country studies
(e.g., Fiszbein 1997; Faguet 2004).
The demand for local control of infrastructure spending is high because the
benefits are more readily identified by voters than is the case for many other
government outlays: neighbourhood residents are more likely to care about better
water supply or a new street lighting system than they are about an increase in
public employee wages, the preparation of a new master plan, or improved tax
administration. This kind of anecdotal reasoning leads some to the conclusion that
decentralized infrastructure responsibility should improve allocative (economic)
efficiency by matching provision more closely to local preferences. One example is
some recent research showing that giving responsibility for water supply to local
governments rather than public enterprises increased the quality of the output in
Colombia (Bird 2012).
Other evidence suggests that local control may also lead to increased overall
levels of infrastructure spending (Estache and Sinha 1995; Boadway and Shah
2009). A recent econometric study in Europe, for example, found that
decentralizing revenue authority to subnational governments increased their
investment in economic infrastructure, without reducing their “social” investment
(Kappeler et al. 2012).
Although the political attraction of investing in highly visible public works is
obvious and the economic outcomes of such projects may also be positive,
legitimate questions may still be raised about the relative effectiveness of such
programs in terms of poverty alleviation compared with, say, conditional cash
transfers (McCord 2012). Even in this respect, however, some evidence suggests
that appropriately locating such “geographic capital” (Jalan and Ravallion 2002)
may have significant impacts on improving the access of the poor to markets, work
opportunities, and welfare (Majumder 2012). As Fiszbein (1997) noted some years
ago, for example, poor people in an isolated mountain village may quite rationally
choose to invest resources in improving market roads rather than primary
education—or whatever else planners in the capital city may think is best for them.
But are such potential efficiency gains from decentralization always—or
even often—captured? There are a number of reasons why they may not be,
starting with the possibility that the local population may not have a vote that
allows them to express preferences (nor a credible exit threat), as in China,
Vietnam, or Nepal. In China, for example, subnational governments have
considerable discretion in making infrastructure decisions, but their political
leaders are appointed and are accountable upward, not downward. Infrastructure
accomplishments have been remarkable in China, but it is not clear how much
of this is driven by local preferences (Dollar and Hofman 2008). Bird et al.
(2011) discuss a study of about 500 villages that indicates that relatively little
attention was paid to local preferences in making decisions about local
expenditures in China.
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Even where there is local voting, decision-making about public spending may
be captured by powerful interest groups within the community, such as local
politicians or community organizations, or by central ministries.8 The process of
selecting and designing capital projects may not be weighted in favour of the
preferences of the local population (Peterson and Muzzini 2005), or the
procurement process may be corrupt and inefficient. Government structure itself
may be an impediment where the large size of provinces and cities make the flow
of benefits from capital investments all but invisible to individual households.
Some of these obstacles to capturing the potential efficiency gains from fiscal
decentralization can be overcome or at least ameliorated. One way is to provide for
submunicipalities within large urban areas and to give them some degree of
decision-making power and a budget. This approach allows for implementation of
small-scale projects at the neighbourhood level, and might provide a stronger voice
for neighbourhood populations in the selection and design of larger capital
projects. Examples of this are the barangay governments in metropolitan Manila9
and the extensive use of locally based benefit funding of investment projects in
some Colombian cities (Bird 2012).
Another way to do a better job of capturing the benefits of decentralized
infrastructure spending is to monitor client satisfaction with infrastructure
services. The use of surveys to gain some information on citizen perceptions about
the quality of services delivered can be an important input to identifying new
infrastructure needs and maintenance requirements. While surveying is often done
in the case of recurrent expenditures, it is less often done with respect to
infrastructure (Peterson and Muzzini 2005).
Technical efficiency
Welfare gains from the decentralization of responsibility for infrastructure services
can also result when services are produced at lower cost. One important way to
lower costs is to deliver services more efficiently. A recent study in Ontario,
Canada, for example, reports that 20 percent of treated water is “lost” in the
distribution system before it reaches consumers (Herstein 2012). Such leakages
through technical failures (as well as through theft) are often much larger in
developing countries and might be lowered when providers are more directly
8. Berry (2009) provides a detailed account of the extent to which special-purpose local
governments in the United States have been “captured” by such groups as developers, other
business interests, and public-sector workers. The history of municipal infrastructure
development around the world is replete with similar stories of elite capture: see, for
example, the account in Briggs (1996) of city development in the United Kingdom in the
19th century, when most infrastructure was financed by (subsidized) private firms.
9. The barangay (district, ward, village) is the lowest level of local government in the
Philippines. It is governed by an elected local council, responsible for certain local services
and financed largely by a national transfer based on population and land area. There are over
1,700 barangays in the Metro Manila area.
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responsible and responsive to consumers, although empirical evidence on this
point is lacking.
One must also consider the technology used to produce and, especially, maintain,
services. For instance, in rural areas, pumps that can be repaired locally may be
preferable to more modern equipment that requires more expert servicing, just as
schools that can be built with local labour and materials may be cheaper to construct
and maintain than those that meet the latest specifications sent from the experts in the
capital. On the other hand, sometimes infrastructure inputs may be more efficiently
“outsourced” to central (or private) design, production and procurement, provided
adequate attention is paid to local conditions and preferences.
An interesting recent project to improve public transit in Ahmedabad, India,
by building a new Ahmedabad Bus Rapid Transit Service (ABRTS) illustrates some
of these points. This project seems to be surprisingly successful in its first years
(National Institute of Urban Affairs 2011) for a number of reasons. First, its
designers paid close attention to experience elsewhere with similar projects, both
successful (e.g., Bogotá) and unsuccessful (e.g., Delhi). Second, in both the design
and the implementation phases, extensive efforts were made to consult not only
with customers (actual and prospective), but also with such “stakeholders” as
those who provide competitive modes of transport. As a result, substantial efforts
were made to turn competing into complementary (feeder) modes. Third, close
attention was paid to the specific urban context in which the system was to
operate, by establishing routes that would reduce congestion, and minimizing
conflict around religious sites. Fourth, an extensive “pilot” operation was carried
out to test the system, and this led to significant improvements. For example, the
trial buses had metal seats that (unsurprisingly) turned out to be too hot for
comfort and were therefore replaced by others before the system was finally
launched. Local people were involved in all stages of the project cycle, not just by
securing their agreement and approval, but by actively involving them in
identifying and initiating projects (what most needs to be done and where), in
project design (exactly where and in what way), and even, to some extent, in
execution and operation (using local labour where feasible), as well as in
monitoring and evaluating services.
For capital-intensive services such as railways and national trunk roads, the
presence of economies of scale rules out some functions for decentralized
assignment. The cost of delivery by small-area governments would be prohibitive
for such services. But for most capital projects, the right level to assign expenditure
responsibility and the extent to which local governments are “right-sized” with
respect to taking advantage of economies of scale (and scope) remains an open
question (Fox and Gurley 2006).
Also debatable is the extent to which local governments take advantage of
economies of scale.10 The empirical evidence is, at best, mixed. Byrnes and Dollery
(2002), for example, reviewed research on economies of scale in the United
10. Much of the following discussion is based on Slack and Bird (2012).
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Kingdom and the United States and concluded that only 8 percent of the studies
found evidence of economies of scale in local government, 29 percent found
evidence of U-shaped cost curves, 39 percent found no statistical relationship
between per capita expenditure and population size, and 24 percent found
evidence of diseconomies of scale. Studies that analyzed specific services (e.g., fire,
housing) also showed mixed results. On the whole, there is no strong evidence of
economies of scale with respect to most services for municipalities larger than
20,000 to 40,000 in population.11 This does not mean that there are no size effects
or that per-capita expenditures do not fall as the scale of local government
operations increases. More likely it reflects the difficulty of separating the pure
effects of scale on government costs from the effects of everything else.
Economies of scale depend on the service in question and the units of
measurement—such as the jurisdiction size or the size of the facility. Hirsch
(1959), for example, estimated cost functions for police services, fire services,
refuse collection, water, sewage, and education and found that expenditures per
capita declined with the quantity provided for water and sewage (perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the heavy infrastructure component of such services)—but
that there was no similar decline for other urban services generally provided by
local governments in the United States. For some services, expenditures per capita
actually rose as output expanded, indicating diseconomies of scale. Other studies
that have estimated cost functions have similarly found economies of scale for hard
services such as water, sewers, and transportation, but generally not for soft
services such as police, refuse collection, recreation, or planning (Bird and Slack
1993). Hard services are capital-intensive, so large government units can more
readily make the substantial capital investments needed to extend the water
distribution system or build a least-unit-cost-sized sewage treatment plant (Bahl
and Linn 1992). Other services, such as policing, are highly labour-intensive and
hence unlikely to show significant economies of scale. Presumably much the same
can be said with respect to other labour-intensive services like social services,
education, and, to some extent, even health.
11.There are problems with the methodology used to measure cost and output (Byrnes and
Dollery 2002). In most studies, expenditures are used as the measure of cost and population
is used as the proxy for size or scale. First, population may not be the best measure for this
purpose. A larger population may mean greater need for expenditures, but the characteristics
of the population will also influence need. For example, a municipality with a large
proportion of elderly residents will have different expenditure needs from one with a
younger population of the same size; an urban population will have different expenditure
needs from a rural population. The density and geographic distribution of population may
also be an important factor affecting both needs and costs. Second, population does not
reflect the non-resident population that visits a local government area and uses its services.
Third, with respect to the measurement of cost, expenditures are not always the best proxy
because they not only include costs, but also reflect quality of services and possibly wasteful
expenditures. Few studies of economies of scale include service levels.
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Recent studies in Canada and Finland, for example, have found little evidence
of economies of scale in large municipalities. Found (2012) analyzed economies of
scale for fire and police in 445 municipalities in Ontario, Canada, from 2005 to
2008. He found that fire services exhibited U-shaped cost curves with a costminimizing population of approximately 20,000 residents. Police services also
exhibited U-shaped cost curves with a cost-minimizing population of about 45,000
residents. In Finland, Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta (2010) reported on a
number of studies of the effects of municipal mergers on per-capita expenditures
and found the results to be mixed, with the biggest cities showing relatively low
cost efficiency with respect to basic welfare services. Other studies in Finland that
focused on specific municipal services (health centres and schooling) found the
optimal size of the municipality to be somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000
people (Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta 2010).
As important as economies of scale (and scope) are economies of density (Bel
forthcoming). For example, a recent study of annexation that analyzed 952 U.S.
cities (with at least 10,000 people each) that annexed other municipalities between
1992 and 2002 found efficiencies from increasing land area, but only if the
annexation was accompanied by higher densities (Edwards and Xiao 2009). If
densities fall following annexation, per-capita expenditures may increase or
decrease depending on the relationship of the change in land area to changes in
density. The authors found that service delivery and administrative efficiencies are
achieved with high-density developments, but compromised with low-density
developments that are spread out and more costly to serve.
The question of economies of scale aside, there is some support for the
argument that decentralization can lead to more cost-effective outcomes for capital
projects. It can be argued that the cost of production is cheaper when local labour
and materials are used and the bureaucratic costs of managing a project from the
centre are avoided. There is some evidence to support this argument, though the
results are far from conclusive (Peterson and Muzzini 2005). But this cost
advantage does not hold in all countries. For example, the World Bank (2009a)
reports that subnational government spending for roads in Colombia is expensive
and wasteful. However, as Bird (2012) argues, it appears that this result reflects in
part the unclear nature of the initial assignment of functions (which led to
continual disputes about which level of government was responsible for what
when it came to roads), and in part the confusing way in which roads were
financed. In Colombia, all three levels of government are involved in financing this
activity, but the two subnational levels receive most of their funding from the
national government through several different channels. As a result, not only is the
“ownership” of (and responsibility for) roads further confused, but the diverse and
volatile set of funding sources makes it exceptionally difficult either to invest
sensibly or to maintain investments properly once made.
Externalities
When the delivery of a service leads to impacts on households that reside outside
the boundaries of the jurisdiction, the lower-tier governments will underspend (or
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overspend) because they account only for local benefits and costs in their
budgetary decisions. Because the social costs and benefits due to spillover
effects are ignored, society will not achieve as high a level of welfare as would be
the case if the service had been assigned to either the regional or even the
national level. Functions with high spillover effects, such as public health
services, are not good candidates for delivery by a subnational government
unless the area served can be expanded so that the externalities can be
internalized or the government can arrange for payment by non-residents that
would compensate for the benefits received.
For purposes of working out the assignment of each function to different
levels of government, it is necessary to estimate the benefit (cost) zone for each
expenditure function. This is mission impossible because nearly all functions
delivered by government impose external effects, yet rational public policy reform
requires identification of the degree of the spillover effects and estimation of the
costs of internalizing them. The analysis for each function is not likely to result in
precise estimates for these benefit zones, but it may be good enough to guide the
expenditure assignment decision for each infrastructure service.
The result of this exercise will be to assign responsibility for every
infrastructure function to either local, regional, or central government.12
Sometimes, the external benefit or cost zone is so great that only central
government responsibility will do. This is the case if the service benefits or burdens
the entire national population (e.g., defence) or there is a strong interest in
maintaining national standards (education or the social safety net). In some cases,
the external effects are deemed small enough to be ignored.
As a rule, however, benefit and cost spillovers related to the provision of
infrastructure services generally relate to an area smaller than the entire nation,
especially in larger countries. Provincial- or state-level governments might be the
right choice for delivery of functions such as intermunicipal roads and watershed
management. Some externalities may be internalized by assigning functions to an
even smaller jurisdiction: for example, water supply, mass transit, and urban
planning might be best assigned to metropolitan-area-wide governments, although
all too often such governments do not exist, have the wrong powers, or do not have
appropriate boundaries (Bahl and Linn 1992).
Certain institutional arrangements may be used to address the spillover effects
that come with decentralization.
• First, the process begins with a clear identification of services for which
the externalities are too large to be assigned to subnational
governments. Carrying out this task correctly is not easy because of the
12. Actually, if such an exercise were done seriously, it would likely end up prescribing a
different geographic “benefit” level for every public-sector activity and subactivity—or
perhaps even for every geographic locality. As noted earlier, however, such a proliferation of
special service districts is seldom a good idea.
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difficulty of separating true external costs and benefits from the desire
of central ministries to continue their control over certain programs.
• Second, infrastructure responsibilities can be unbundled into
subcomponents that do not have large spillovers and those that do. In
China, for example, the central government sets standards for such
services as health care, while the subnational governments are given
responsibility for design and implementation of particular projects, and
for financing.
• Third, central governments can use intergovernmental transfers of
various kinds to induce subnational governments to correct for
underspending on services with large externalities. As discussed further
below, these usually take the form of conditional grants.
• Finally, it might be decided that the lowest levels of government cannot
handle the externality (or even the management) issues. In this case,
decentralization for certain functions is still possible in the form of
special-purpose public enterprises that operate on a local basis. In some
Indian metropolitan areas, certain local infrastructure services are
delivered by single-purpose metropolitan special districts, which would
seem to address the externalities and economies of scale issues.
However, these parastatals are state-owned, and so the responsiveness
to local preferences is weakened (Mohanty et al. 2008).
Another option is contracting for services, either to a private firm or to
another local government. While arranging some form of contracting between
larger and smaller local governments for service delivery is an attractive alternative
in principle, in practice it has turned out to be difficult to sustain such
arrangements, even in such well-governed and homogenous developed countries
as Denmark and Finland.13
Managing infrastructure
A proper schedule of maintenance can markedly enhance the flow of services from
capital assets and extend their useful life. But maintenance is problematic under a
decentralized system, for three reasons. First, the base of local revenues that can be
used to maintain the capital stock is limited. Subnational governments raise only
about 2.5 percent of GDP from own sources in developing countries (see Table 3).
Ingram, Liu, and Brandt (2013) estimate that the required annual maintenance
costs for urban infrastructure in developing countries is equivalent to about
2 percent of GDP.14
13. See the extensive discussion of such problems in Kim, Lotz, and Mau (2010).
14. An earlier study (covering rural and urban areas in developing countries) for the 2005–
2010 period estimated future maintenance needs in developing countries to average about
3.3 to 3.5 percent of GDP (Estache 2006).
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Table 3: Fiscal Decentralization: International Comparisons for the 2000s
Subnational government
expenditures*
Region

Subnational government
taxes*

Percent of total
government
expenditures

Percent
of GDP

Percent of
total taxes

Percent of
GDP

Developing countries

18.8
(16)

5.1
(20)

11.4
(16)

2.3
(20)

Industrial countries

27.8
(26)

13.9
(26)

22.7
(24)

6.4
(25)

Source: IMF (various years) and estimates drawn from case studies.
Note: Data reported are unweighted averages for the 2000s for years in which data are reported.
*The number in parenthesis shows the number of countries included in the comparison.

Second, local officials may be prone to ignore maintenance in favour of more
high-profile construction of new infrastructure or in favour of satisfying such other
demands as public employee wage increases. Moreover, from their perspective it
may be politically simpler to obtain new capital financing from higher levels of
government than to obtain more tax revenue from their constituents.
Third, as mentioned earlier with respect to roads in Colombia, the ownership
of the public asset should be clear, lest there be confusion over which level of
government is responsible for its maintenance (World Bank 2009a).
Are there institutional and behavioural arrangements that can overcome the
production efficiency disadvantages of subnational governments in the
decentralization of infrastructure services? Four possibilities might be suggested.
• First, if a service has been assigned to subnational governments, limit
interference from upper-level governments that may increase costs. The
involvement of higher-level governments (for example, by imposing
mandates) should be limited to concerns about externalities and
perhaps the regular monitoring of maintenance. Mandates to spend a
specified minimum share of the budget on economic development, or a
specified maximum share on personnel, reduce local spending
flexibility if they are effective and are not easily enforced in any case.
Some countries (such as Colombia) commonly earmark significant
portions of general intergovernmental transfers to “investment,” largely
to avoid the dissipation of such transfers in current expenditures—
which all too often line the pockets of local officials and their friends
and relatives rather than provide valued services to citizens in general.
It is far from clear, however, that such earmarking achieves its objective.
Indeed, as noted later, there are both theoretical and empirical support
for the contrary view that reducing earmarking is more likely to
improve than to distort the allocation of local resources.
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• Second, in the case of urban governments, expand the tax and userbenefit charge powers of subnational governments. This involves giving
subnational governments access to a larger tax base and the autonomy
to use this base. Increased provincial and local revenues would provide
a funding base for infrastructure maintenance.
• Third, close the “back door” to infrastructure finance that is often
provided by higher-level governments. In Mexico, for example, as much
as 10 percent of intergovernmental transfers to subnational
governments are given in the form of ad hoc grants to subnational
governments (Bahl and Sethi 2012). This approach discourages the
mobilization of local revenue and reduces the transparency of the
system of intergovernmental transfers.
• Fourth, unbundle infrastructure services so that subfunctions not
characterized by clear advantages of centralization can be assigned to
subnational governments. Costs can be reduced by disaggregating
infrastructure expenditures into components, and making assignments
on a basis of comparative advantage. For example, while technical
specifications required to ensure water quality may be a matter of
national concern, the construction of major water supply and sewage
lines (like interurban highways) may best be handled at the regional
level, and local distribution lines could be the responsibility of local
governments. Such decentralization is likely to work better when
central governments make an effort to establish good “framework” laws
(e.g., on tendering and on intergovernmental agreements), upgrade
local capacity to deal with such issues, and monitor and evaluate
outcomes. In a sense, the issue here is similar to that raised below with
respect to public-private infrastructure projects: in order to reap the full
benefits of decentralization, investment must be made in improving the
regulatory framework at the national level and executive capacity at the
local level.
Corruption
A possible cost of fiscal decentralization is that it may lead to greater corruption.
The thinking here is that the “closeness” between elected local politicians and the
local political power structure breeds corruption. Both Prud’homme (1995) and
Tanzi (1996) have presented this view as one of the dangers of decentralization.
There are further reasons why one might expect more corruption in a decentralized
fiscal system. One is that the probability of successful stealing is increased by the
weakening of central authority and monitoring. Various students of corruption
have placed the blame on the greater number of contacts with public officials in
developing countries, on lower-paid local public officials who have more incentive
to steal than higher-paid central officials, and on local government voters who have
not yet learned to use their power to monitor and discipline their employees. These
problems may be especially serious with respect to infrastructure, where there is
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more latitude for fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and patronage than with respect to
other, more “regular” activities of local public officials and politicians. Moreover,
local corruption, even if smaller in scale, may be particularly damaging to building
“trust” in government, owing to the more visible inequalities that may result.
Nonetheless, the case that corruption and decentralization are positively
linked might be more impressionistic than real, and the empirical evidence is
divided on whether corruption costs are greater under a more decentralized
system.15 Perhaps the common perception of high local corruption is unduly
influenced by its greater visibility; corruption may be even greater with respect to
centralized decisions if they are less transparent.
We are not aware of comparable recent estimates of the cost of corruption in
the infrastructure sector. Data are scarce and the conceptual model is not easily
worked out. In earlier work, however, Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) argued that
corruption will lower infrastructure spending (fewer projects will be undertaken),
while Mauro (1995) argued that corruption is more likely to raise infrastructure
spending (higher unit costs). Whatever the outcome, information is scarce and
unreliable, and helpful and feasible solutions short of a fundamental revision of the
relationship between state and citizens are not easy to design or implement.
Politicians and officials who gain much of their income from exploiting their
monopoly power to grant licences, bestow contracts, or provide services are not
likely to give it up easily. Neither regulation nor privatization seems to provide
complete answers to controlling the problem.
As Estache (2006) notes, corruption is a symptom of a deeper underlying
problem—the lack of political commitment and accountability. For example,
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) have shown that simply financing local
infrastructure through user fees rather than local taxes or intergovernmental
transfers will reduce corruption, no matter how poorly local democracy works. As
we discuss below, however, almost no infrastructure investment in developing
countries is financed this way, and this situation seems unlikely to change soon.
Capacity
Subnational governments in developing countries often do not have the ability to
design, build, and operate infrastructure, and seldom know enough to “outsource”
the needed skills efficiently and effectively. Many who write on the possible dangers
of decentralization emphasize the poor quality of local administration in most
developing countries (Prud’homme 1995), although the variability even within
specific countries makes generalization difficult. On the other hand, some evidence
suggests that the quality of municipal management of public service delivery has
improved in recent years in certain developing countries (World Bank 2009).
While there is often good reason for concern about the capacity of subnational
governments to deliver services, to a considerable extent countries get the local
15. For reviews of this literature, see Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado, and Boex (2007),
and Boadway and Shah (2009).
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governments they want and deserve. Subnational politicians and officials, like
those at the central government level, respond to the incentives they face. If those
incentives discourage initiative and reward inefficiency and corruption, it should
not be surprising when local governments turn out to be corrupt and inefficient.
Given appropriate incentives (in terms of heightened expectations of improved
services from their constituents and access to resources for which they are
politically responsible), even very small local governments have sometimes
demonstrated significant improvements in administrative capacity within a
relatively short time (Fiszbein 1997; Faguet 2004).
As Fiszbein (1997) noted in an early evaluation of decentralization in
Colombia, for example, when given the chance to do more when they received
more resources after a constitutional revision, some—not all—municipalities took
steps to improve their capacities. Some, for example, improved the skills of local
officials through competitive hiring, some shared the services of professional staff
with neighbouring municipalities, and some undertook more training of municipal
employees. Some municipalities also improved their capacity to carry out effective
infrastructure projects. One, for example, privatized road maintenance; another
put private developers in charge of the construction of urban roads; others
introduced computers to monitor water and sanitation services, shared equipment
with others, and directly attempted to improve their ability to manage municipal
projects. While by no means all did such things, one result of the increased local
engagement and “ownership” was that surveys found most respondents trusted the
local government more than the national government to deliver the goods and
services that they wanted (Fiszbein 1997).
Most municipalities concentrated on roads, education, and water works.
These priorities may not have been what the central officials previously in charge
thought was most important, but these were the needs local people perceived, and
they were the needs that at least some of the newly empowered and responsive
local governments attempted to meet. Although over the succeeding decade of
political turmoil and civil strife, much of this initial positive response appears to
have faded away, even a decade later, surveys continued to show that most
Colombians were happier to pay local than national taxes, presumably because
they felt they were getting more for their money (Acosta and Bird 2005).
3. Reconciling Theory and Practice
Theory tells us that efficient infrastructure is often decentralized infrastructure and
that decentralized infrastructure should be efficient. In practice, however, the
underlying conditions needed to ensure that this proposition holds are seldom
met. The result is that in too many instances not only is infrastructure not provided
efficiently, but the perceived failures of decentralized infrastructure lead to
“corrective” actions that prevent decentralization itself from realizing its potential
advantages. In most cases, the answer to these problems is to “decentralize”
correctly, which means, essentially, satisfying three conditions:
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• First, public-sector functions must be sufficiently unbundled to assign
them to the correct levels of government: both who is responsible for
what and who is accountable to whom for what must be clearly
delineated.16 Clarity in assignment must be matched by accountability,
in terms of both political democracy and transparency of operation, as
well as by authority in terms of both the ability to manage expenditures
and to determine (within limits) revenues.
• Second, subnational governments must be adequately accountable in
political, administrative, and financial terms both to those they are
supposed to serve—their residents—as well as to those above them in
the governmental hierarchy who may be responsible for developing
policy, regulating how it is carried out, and often financing the activities
of such governments. Such “dual accountability” is neither easy to
design nor to implement.
• Third, the achievement of both the previous conditions is premised on
the design and implementation of a sound intergovernmental finance
system, one that devolves appropriate revenue-raising powers to
subnational governments, makes it possible for them to employ these
powers effectively, supplements local finance when appropriate through
well-designed transfers, and provides adequate access to private sources
of finance, particularly with respect to financing infrastructure
investment. We develop some aspects of this third point in the present
section.

3.1 Improve local governance
The efficiency of decentralized expenditure assignment for infrastructure is
enhanced by local financing of these capital projects. If full financing is by transfers
from higher-level governments and loans from state banks, then local officials are
not fully accountable to the voters for the quality of services delivered.
Subnational governments in developing countries have access to three sources
for financing capital expenditures: own source taxes, charges, and other non-tax
revenues; intergovernmental transfers; and various types of privatization
schemes.17 In many countries, however, both the structure of these financing
instruments and their implementation impede more efficient and equitable
outcomes in the delivery of infrastructure services.
16. As mentioned earlier, experience suggests that it is important not to separate
responsibilities for building infrastructure from those for operating and maintaining it in
order to avoid creating distortionary incentives affecting both current and capital
expenditures.
17. Countries may also receive capital transfers from external donors. As Estache (2010)
notes, aid-financed infrastructure is especially important in some countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. However, we do not consider this source further in this paper; for a review, see Kharas
and Linn (2013).
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No unified theory of revenue assignment exists that will allow identification
of both the right level of subnational government financing and the right mix of
revenue instruments to use (Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). As Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2006) show, if infrastructure investment is financed by user charges,
it is efficient. More generally, to the extent that subnational government revenues
are raised according to the benefit principle—so that at the margin those who
benefit from local infrastructure investment are those who finance it—the
financing of infrastructure will be efficient. If locally raised taxes are paid entirely
by those who benefit from local services, subnational governments will not
overspend because they will not be able to export part or all of their tax burden to
other jurisdictions (McLure 1998).
This condition may seem strict, but there are plenty of viable revenue options
for covering this amount, including property and non-property taxation, and userbenefit charges (Bahl and Bird 2008). Significant increases in the mobilization of
subnational government revenue through such “good” (local benefit) taxes and
charges are feasible in many countries. However, higher-level governments in
developing countries are seldom willing to give up productive revenue sources
such as income or general sales taxes to subnational governments. Already
strapped for revenues, they are hesitant to introduce competition for their tax
bases, especially in the large urban areas where most taxes are raised, even when
those are the subnational governments that both need and could use most
effectively additional revenue from such sources.
Elected officials in some subnational governments are also hesitant to push for
new taxing powers, precisely because it would ultimately force them into a
position of greater accountability to their constituents. They prefer to claim
increasing shares of national transfers (or foreign aid) rather than ask their
residents to pay higher taxes. All too often, when subnational governments do get
the green light on taxation, they are saddled with a limited choice of instruments
and, in some instances, implement poorly structured taxes on business. These
taxes may have undesirable efficiency effects but are nonetheless used extensively
because subnational governments are able to impose them without having to rely
on decisions by higher-level governments that would otherwise permit them to
raise property taxes (Bird 2006; Martinez-Vazquez 2012).

3.2 User charges
For utilities in particular, user charges are the obvious and ideal source of finance.18
Beneficiaries pay, and if the charges are set at the level of full cost recovery, debt
service and maintenance can be supported. User financing of infrastructure
ensures that those who benefit pay for what they receive, which is one of the best
ways of ensuring that a particular service is worth what it costs. However, there are
two big problems with advocating user-charge financing of infrastructure in
developing countries.
18. For further discussion of the appropriate role and design of user charges, see Bahl and
Linn (1992); Bird (2001).
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One problem commonly perceived is that many people in developing
countries are simply too poor to pay much. Too often this concern has resulted in
too-low prices that benefit mainly richer consumers. Many governments grant
subsidies and hold down tariff rates, with the result that much less than full-cost
recovery—often even less than operating-cost recovery—is the rule rather than the
exception (Estache 2010). The bulk of the effective public subsidy is captured by
the few and fortunate and the resulting financial stringency ensures that not only
do the poor continue to go without access to essential services such as basic water
and sewage facilities, but also that the services provided are inadequately
maintained, with resultant losses in supply. Many schemes to overcome such
problems have been put forward over the years, but few countries appear to have
made a serious attempt to price public services efficiently while taking adequate
account (e.g., through “lifeline” or other tariff structures) of the need to provide a
basic level of service to those who are unable to bear the full cost.19
The second problem with user charge financing is that no one likes it,
especially when paying for what one gets is not now the norm. People who are now
receiving (often poor) service do not see why they should have to pay more and
are unlikely to believe that they will, someday, receive something better for their
money. People who do not now receive services may not believe that if they agree
to pay more than those now getting the service pay, they will get some benefits
from doing so. Politicians do not want to make current service recipients unhappy
by making them pay and cannot easily sell “pay for what you get” to people who
have long seen others getting without paying. While some experience suggests
neighbourhood groups and small villages can agree to finance small infrastructure
works that will benefit them directly (Bird 1995), there is little or no evidence that
anyone has been able to devise and implement a “corrective” user charge structure
to rectify the inefficient, inequitable, and ineffective fee structures now found in
most developing countries.

3.3 Property taxes
The property tax can be an efficient source of revenue for financing infrastructure.
In many cases, it finances infrastructure that enhances property values, and its
revenue potential is large. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) estimate that the
property tax yields 2.2 percent of GDP in revenues in industrial countries, but only
about 0.66 percent in developing countries. When the family of taxes on real
property is considered—transfer taxes and various forms of betterment levies—the
revenue potential is even greater, although the economic effects of transfer taxes
leave much to be desired. Moreover, the property tax has the virtue of being a levy
that higher level governments do not want in their tax structure, either because
they recognize the inherent advantage of local governments in administering the
19. For an early review, see Bird and Miller (1989). Unfortunately, little has changed for the
better since that paper was written.
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tax or because they recognize that the unpopularity of the tax goes well beyond its
usually meagre revenue yield.
But property taxes do not finance much infrastructure. The political
unpopularity of the residential tax often leads to a neutering of the tax base,
sometimes by higher-level governments who take credit for new exemptions while
leaving local governments to deal with covering the revenue costs. Moreover,
administration is often weak and always expensive (Bird and Slack 2004;
McCluskey and Franzsen 2013).
Subnational governments might also use property-based taxes to recapture the
value from public investments, and in some cases this approach has yielded
significant amounts of revenue (Alm 2010). In some countries, governments have
been aggressive about using value-capture methods in connection with
infrastructure finance (Colombia), whereas in others (Philippines), it remains a
largely unused resource. But even in the best of cases, such as Colombia, making a
land value recapture scheme successful requires a great deal of technical and
political investment (Bird 2012).

3.4 Other taxes
Subnational governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia have mobilized
significant revenues with subnational government taxes. Argentinean and
Colombian subnational governments use a form of business turnover tax, while
Brazil taxes gross receipts from the sale of services. But these taxes are highly
distortive and serve as general revenues rather than as earmarked sources of funds
for infrastructure. Despite repeated calls to modernize these sales taxes or business
taxes, they continue in their present form.
The other option that is often considered is to abolish distortive subnational
government taxes. South Africa levied a combination gross-receipts-and-turnover
tax, but this was abolished by Parliament in part because of its weak structure and
administration. India’s octroi, a duty levied on goods entering a city for sale, is still
a primary source of revenues for the Mumbai municipal corporation (Pethe 2013)
but has been abolished elsewhere in the subcontinent. In these cases, the abolished
taxes have not been replaced with an equally elastic local revenue source.
Motor vehicle taxes seem a good candidate for infrastructure finance,
particularly for roads and mass transit. All of the possible instruments—licences,
motor fuels, parking fees, and tolls—can be structured as benefit taxes. Certainly
the tax base is growing. It is pointed out that for India, the motor vehicle
population increased one-hundred-fold between 1951 and 2004 and at an even
faster rate in the 2000s (High Powered Expert Committee 2011, 56). On the
administration side, the most difficult problem is to allocate the funds to the place
where the vehicles are used rather than where the distributor is located, but this
might be done using distributors’ shipment records until collection at the pump
becomes a possibility.
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3.5 Non-tax revenues
Like motor vehicle taxes, some non-tax revenues might be earmarked for
infrastructure finance, even though the link between beneficiaries and burdens
might not be so clear. Chinese metropolitan governments have been particularly
innovative and have engaged heavily in land sales (long-term leases) as a method
of mobilizing resources for infrastructure finances. For all local governments in
China, land leases now account for about 30 percent of revenues (Wong 2013).
Land sales have great advantages, namely the revenue potential and the low
political cost (at least in China) of raising money this way. But even in a unique
setting like China, there are drawbacks. Land revenues are sensitive to the real
estate cycle and land value collateral for loans is risky; “easy money” can lead to
overspending in local government budgets; the opportunity costs of converting
land to urban use can be underestimated; and government-owned land is an
exhaustible resource.
A more difficult arrangement to assess is the earmarking of certain revenues
for infrastructure development. An example is Peru, where natural resource
revenues are distributed on a derivation basis and must be spent for economic
development purposes (Canavire-Bacarreza et al. 2012; Martinez-Vazquez 2012).
On the one hand, the goal of such a program is to replace the lost “heritage” of the
region with a new infrastructure. Management issues aside, there is some merit to
this justification. On the other, this kind of earmarking introduces a functionfollows-finance model and provides little incentive for efficient spending.
Even without a separate system of capital transfers, some countries (e.g.,
Colombia) commonly earmark significant portions of general intergovernmental
transfers to “investment,” apparently in large part to restrain the feared dissipation
of such transfers in current expenditures.20 It is far from clear that such earmarking
achieves its objective. Indeed, some evidence suggests that reducing earmarking is
more likely to improve than to distort the allocation of local resources. The
theoretical argument is simply the standard decentralization theorem: that
allowing funds to be spent according to local tastes yields, on the whole, superior
allocative and distributional results. Empirical evidence in Norway (Borge et al.
2012) supports this argument strongly.
Although one may doubt the relevance of this experience to developing
countries in which “elite capture” of local governments seems likely, studies in
Bolivia and Colombia (Faguet 2005) also point in this direction. Most interestingly,
perhaps, a recent study of the European Union (Kappeler et al. 2012) finds that
revenue decentralization tends to increase subnational infrastructure investment.
Earmarking local revenues for infrastructure may make sense when there are good
reasons (efficiency, equity, and management) for doing so. Small projects with welldefined benefit groups are most likely to meet these conditions. In other cases,
20. In Colombia, the potentially pernicious effects of such earmarking are perhaps mitigated
to some extent by the fact that “investment” is interpreted to include so-called “social
investment” in health, education, and so on.
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however, such earmarking may distort local preferences, exacerbate perverse
incentives to build new rather than maintain existing infrastructure, and connect
revenue sources with particular expenditures in ways that lack economic and
political logic. And, finally, there is the fungibility problem: it is not usually
possible to separate the expenditure of the earmarked revenues from the
expenditure of other revenues.

3.6 Intergovernmental transfers
Since subnational governments in most developing countries have limited own
resources and little access to private capital markets, to carry out costly public
works they usually rely heavily on grants (or subsidized loans) from higher-level
governments. Depending on how the transfer system is structured, it may have a
direct or an indirect effect on infrastructure finance.
Most countries structure their transfer systems using some combination of
three approaches. The first is unconditional grants, which are an indirect way to
provide infrastructure finance. These funds can be used for maintenance of the
public capital stock and for debt repayment, though the grant funds are not
directly tied to either.
In the eyes of lenders, the security associated with unconditional grants as the
base for repayment is not strong. Some countries attempt to get around this
problem by ensuring that these transfers cover debt service costs. This means
providing for an intercept arrangement or allowing these transfers to be pledged to
repay debt, as has been done in Mexico (Revilla 2012). Although many countries
prohibit such arrangements, this approach to, in effect, “earmarking” grants to
service the debt on capital projects deserves consideration.
A second approach is to make grants to local governments conditional on their
expenditure for a particular capital purpose, often with no matching arrangement
and in practice often with little supervision, either before or after the money flows.
Often these conditional grants are distributed on a formula basis, and in other
cases they take the form of cost reimbursements.
Capital grants to support local infrastructure projects, sometimes with a
requirement of matching funding from local sources, are not uncommon, but the
appropriate design of such transfers is not always easy to determine. A number of
questions need to be considered: Is one aim to rectify imbalances in the
distribution of existing infrastructure (Ahmad and Searle 2006)? To what extent
are such transfers intended to improve economic efficiency—as is presumably the
case with respect to most economic infrastructure such as transportation—or to
ensure equalization by, for example, ensuring at least a minimum standard of such
public services as education and health by providing hospitals and schools in
particular areas (Josie et al. 2008)? Whatever the intended goal, in allocating such
transfers between jurisdictions and in determining the appropriate matching rate,
the nature of capital spending requires that the concept of fiscal capacity be
expanded to encompass not just tax capacity, but also the ability to access credit
markets (Herrero-Alcalde et al. 2011).
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The third approach is more directly tied to infrastructure budgets. It can take
the form of a block grant for infrastructure services on a matching basis. In India,
for example, a large federal grant for urban infrastructure development and slum
upgrading is allocated to cities on a matching basis (High Powered Expert
Committee 2011). The program was introduced in 2005, and while it has
succeeded in focusing increased attention on urban infrastructure issues,
implementation has been slow (Rao and Bird 2011). South Africa uses a more
formal municipal infrastructure grant, designed primarily to improve services in
poor neighbourhoods (van Ryneveld 2007). In Brazil, ad hoc grants are made to
support specific projects.
If done in conjunction with increased local revenue mobilization and costrecovery levels of user charges, a case can be made that any of these approaches to
intergovernmental transfers can lead to a more efficient delivery of infrastructure
services by local governments. Still, conditional grants can be improved in most
countries in a number of ways. For example, the terms and conditions of such
transfers might require subnational governments to prepare adequate investment
and maintenance plans, as well as an appropriate user charge policy. The
governments receiving such transfers should be selected by a systematic process
that pays attention to both need and capacity factors and to the economic
evaluation (cost-benefit analysis) of the project in question. Technical assistance
should be made available to subnational governments to permit them to develop
plans, arrange financing, manage construction, and operate the facility (or to
contract out its operation) efficiently. Finally, to ensure accountability as well as
good outcomes, the execution and operation of the grant-aided work should be
monitored and evaluated, with periodic progress reports, field inspections, and
formal evaluations of outcomes, including consumer surveys.
These conditions may be too much to expect in many developing countries.
Nonetheless, as the early experience with “municipal development funds”
(Davey 1988) has demonstrated, if such conditions are not satisfied, the results
of capital transfers and loans are unlikely to live up to expectations. Subnational
infrastructure finance inevitably depends greatly on transfers from higher-level
governments. These transfers may be efficiency-enhancing when they take the
form of conditional grants designed to correct for underspending on services
characterized by externalities. Few such transfers are found in practice, however,
partly because the design of a conditional grant for infrastructure involves
guesswork if (as theory suggests) one goal is to correct for underspending as a
result of not taking externalities into account. It involves identifying a target for
the optimal level of spending for the function that takes account of social as well
as local benefits, as well as having some notion of the elasticity of demand for the
infrastructure service. Careful targeting along these lines is an essential
ingredient of effective subsidy policy in resource-constrained countries, but
most infrastructure-related transfers, perhaps understandably, take a more
general approach.
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3.7 Borrowing
Borrowing is not itself a source of revenue, but rather an efficient way to arrange
payment for the purchase of public assets that have a long life. By matching
payment for the infrastructure with the pattern of consumption of the asset,
governments can immediately begin capturing the returns from infrastructure
investments while deferring the payments. But in the end, the loans must be
repaid—from the own-source revenues of the subnational governments, from user
charges, or from intergovernmental transfers.
The essential foundation of a sound subnational borrowing program is thus a
sound subnational fiscal structure in terms both of access to own-source revenues
and a well-designed and stable intergovernmental transfer system. Still, loans are
often essential because they offer subnational governments a way to attract the
large amount of funds necessary for financing the construction phase. Moreover,
in principle they are an economically efficient (and equitable) source of finance
because the debt has to be repaid (from current revenues) during the life of the
project, that is, while it is providing benefits to local residents.
But borrowing by subnational governments can lead to problems, as students
of local public finance have long argued (Prud’homme 1995; Tanzi 1996). The
revenue stream of local government revenues may not be large enough to sustain
repayment, but borrowing occurs anyway in anticipation of some form of bailout.
This well-known moral hazard problem has led to overborrowing and to some
form of bailout of subnational governments in Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and
more recently in China (de Mello 2007; Wong 2013). Many countries attempt to
control overborrowing by subnational governments with various forms of fiscal
responsibility legislation (Liu and Webb 2011). These programs have met with
varying degrees of success. The problem with bailouts is that subnational
governments learn that there is always a way around the hard budget constraint,
and they may return to the strategy of overspending on infrastructure. A good
borrowing framework can head off this tendency, but it may close the borrowing
window for those local governments that have the greatest infrastructure gaps.
Bundling subnational borrowing—for example, by having regional entities
borrow for smaller local authorities—may make sense on cost grounds. Similarly,
packaging subnational borrowing in some form such as a national infrastructure
bank may make sense when financing flows to projects that, although the
responsibility of subnational governments, are of national significance (e.g., as part
of a national network of roads or electricity distribution). In most cases, however,
loans from such public financial institutions are extended on subsidized terms and
are in effect a variant form of matching grant.
Although the lessons of unfortunate experiences with such “soft” funding may
have been learned, as yet there appears to be no foolproof institutional way to
avoid the hard necessity of first establishing subnational finances on a sound and
sustainable basis so that at least some of them—probably the largest and betteroff—are, when financial markets are sufficiently developed, creditable candidates
for private-sector financing. When subnational governments are charged with an
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important role in providing infrastructure, many of them will need both technical
and financial support to play that role adequately, but it is important to ensure that
financial resources do not arrive in ways that distort the incentives facing
subnational decision-makers in ways that may damage both the provision of
infrastructure and, more broadly, governance at the subnational level.21

3.8 Public-private partnerships (PPPs)
Much the same can be said with respect to PPPs. Over the past two decades, many
decision-makers have promoted increased private involvement in infrastructure
creation to increase the efficiency of service provision and to provide badly needed
resources to support urban infrastructure investment. Klein (2012) argues that
both of these justifications need to be qualified. Private-sector “resources” come
from user charges, which can also be realized by local governments if levied at costrecovery rates. And, the private-sector “expertise” may be a step up from local
government capacity but comes with a higher cost of financing.
In addition, there are questions about how PPPs deliver services: full
privatization with various degrees of regulation, or some form of contracting for
operation? The build-operate version is attractive in part precisely because it offers
a way to get facilities built without incurring highly visible government debt.
It would be fair to say that the high hopes for PPPs in the 1990s and early
2000s never materialized. As yet, PPPs have added relatively little to urban capital
financing in developing countries (Alm 2010; Annez 2007). Moreover, less than 10
percent of the investment has been in the high-priority water/sewer sector, mostly
because of pricing risks, and an even smaller share in the form of full or partial
privatization (Menard forthcoming). Most PPPs have focused on the energy and
telecommunications sectors (Klein 2012). Where private capital has been attracted
to these areas (such as in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Argentina), the outcome has often
been conflict and failure, leading to “re-nationalization” of projects initially carried
out by PPPs.
Opinions differ sharply with respect to both the merits of PPP arrangements
and how best to design and implement them. In a recent assessment of the
literature, for example, Merk et al. (2012) conclude that a critical feature (if a PPP
is to minimize project costs) is that the contract should be “global,” that is, a single
contractor should be responsible for managing the whole project in order to reap
full economies of scale and scope and provide maximum incentives to invest and
innovate. In contrast, Siemiatycki and Friedman (2012), considering urban transit
projects in which a major issue is how to allocate “ridership (demand) risk” argue
that “unbundled” contracts that exclude facility operation are often preferable, to
attract more competitive bids and to lower the cost of private-sector borrowing.
The contradictory nature of these recent assessments highlights the importance of
the specific context and institutional and regulatory settings (e.g., the relative
21. For a recent study emphasizing the importance of appropriate incentives, fiscal and
otherwise, with respect to establishing and sustaining sound decentralized governance, see
Faguet (2011).
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development of financial markets and who sets user charges), as well as the
detailed specifics of PPP contracts in determining outcomes.
Even when a transit project is carried out entirely by the public sector,
similar regulatory and financial factors are critical. China, for example, has in
recent years carried out huge urban infrastructure investments through what
may perhaps be thought of as a Chinese variant of PPP, in which both parties to
the contract are really “public.” To illustrate, the extensive Beijing metro system,
like many other projects in China, was financed primarily by bank loans to a
local investment corporation—the Beijing Infrastructure Investment
Corporation—created and controlled by the local government (Su and Zhao
2006). Since the national government strongly encouraged local governments to
make such investments and banks to finance them in doing so, presumably the
banking sector considers such loans to be guaranteed by the state. In addition to
this implicit subsidy, loans to local investment corporations have generally
received an explicit subsidy in the form of an interest rate about 10 percent less
than the normal rate of long-term debt. In reality, however, most local borrowing
is directly serviced from local revenues, which depend on revenue from leasing
land. Such revenue is highly sensitive both to property values and to the amount
of land sold: in 2011, for instance, Beijing’s revenue from this source decreased
by 36 percent from the 2010 level.
Even if one assumes that the whole rapid transit system has been and is
optimally designed, constructed, and operated, there are still problems ahead.
Current plans to expand the metro system further in the next few years and a flatfare policy that already requires an annual operating subsidy (and will need an
even larger one in an expanded system) threaten the sustainability of the financing
model used to build not only the Beijing metro but also much of the extremely
impressive development of urban infrastructure in China in recent years. This
approach to building infrastructure is an example of what Wong (2013) calls
“riding the tiger.” It may soon require reconsideration and in all likelihood
substantial adjustment—unless the urban real-estate sector can realistically be
expected to continue to boom at pre-2010 rates for the next few decades.
To take a different, and perhaps more widely applicable example, Ahmedabad’s
Bus Rapid Transit System was 35 percent financed by a national urban
development program (the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission,
JNNURM), 15 percent by the State of Gujarat, and 50 percent by local sources
(including a dedicated urban transport fund). The system was developed and
implemented through nine separate PPP arrangements negotiated between the
special public corporation (Ahmedabad Janmarg Limited) created for the purpose
and various private providers. These arrangements covered everything from the
major system investment (bus stations, bus corridors, and flyovers, as well as
buses) to housekeeping and parking (National Institute of Urban Affairs 2011).
The resulting system has both substantially improved “people transport” in
the city and has (like the somewhat similar earlier “Transmilenio” BRTS in Bogotá)
won national and international acclaim as a model worthy of emulation elsewhere.
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Some aspects—notably dedicated funding sources for urban transit systems—
have already appeared in several North American cites in recent years:
Vancouver, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City, for example; all collect fees
and taxes dedicated to a regional transportation authority (Institute on
Municipal Finance 2012).
There are, of course, risks associated with public-private partnerships. For the
private sector, for example, there are risks that the regulatory framework or pricing
commitments may change and cause delays in the project. Annez (2007) and
Ingram, Liu, and Brandt (2013) argue that the inherent riskiness of urban
investments in water and sanitation is the main constraint to increasing the flow of
private capital. There is a weak record of full-cost recovery, and often an
unwillingness of local governments to stand behind the kinds of tariff levels and
regulatory arrangements necessary to attract private investors. In many countries
there is what Pethe (2013) describes a “trust deficit” between public and private
sectors that has resulted in episodes like the Bolivian “re-nationalization”
mentioned above. For all these reasons, the World Bank (2009, 32) points to “few
positive results” in efforts to attract private financing of municipal services.
For the public sector, there is the risk that the services provided may not be
what the public wants. There is also the risk that the private partner will fail, or
insist on renegotiating the contract, and the public sector will have to take on the
obligation in full. How successful such arrangements are from the perspective of
either partner depends very much on how the contractual arrangements are
structured and how the risks are shared.22 Given the weak institutional capacity of
subnational governments in many developing countries, it seems unlikely that
they will have a strong hand in negotiating such contracts. The Indian High
Powered Expert Committee for Estimating the Investment Requirements for Urban
Infrastructure (2011, 101) puts it well. “Weak governments cannot rely on private
agents to overcome their weaknesses nor can they expect to make the best possible
bargains for the public they represent.”
4. Two Special Issues: Metropolitan Areas and Regional Equity
In many countries, specific problems call for special consideration, and perhaps for
a different approach to infrastructure delivery. We discuss two such problems: how
best to organize infrastructure provision in metropolitan areas and in their polar
opposite—remote and sparsely populated rural areas—and how to take account of
concerns about “regional equity” in the allocation of infrastructure funding and
projects.

4.1 The need for asymmetry
Some policy-makers in developing countries would argue that in principle,
political institutions should be structured to treat all citizens as equally as possible:
22. For detailed exploration of the structuring of PPP arrangements, see Engel, Fischer, and
Galetovic (2010). For a skeptical view of the range of opportunities to exploit such
possibilities, see Menard (forthcoming).
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they should be symmetrical. On the other hand, if economic institutions are to
produce relatively equal (symmetrical) outcomes they must often be structured
asymmetrically: they must recognize explicitly the very different conditions
existing in different regions and localities.23 Big cities—metropolitan areas—are
different from other urban areas and call for a different treatment as regards fiscal
decentralization. At the other extreme, small, remote municipalities in sparsely
populated regions also call for a special set of financing and service delivery
arrangements.
Metropolitan areas
The expected rate of migration to urban areas over the next two decades will strain
the present network of urban infrastructure and generate new demands that will
be difficult to absorb. The number of megacities (those with a population of more
than 10 million) is projected to increase from 19 now to 27 in 2025, when about
10 percent of the world’s urban population will reside in these cities. Of the
projected 27 megacities, 21 will be in less developed countries. By 2025, there will
be 48 cities with populations between 5 and 10 million, and three-quarters of these
will be in developing countries (United Nations 2008).
Ingram, Liu, and Brandt (2013) estimate that annual urban infrastructure
costs will be equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP for new infrastructure and 2
percent for maintenance. The estimates for India are that to meet projected
needs, urban infrastructure investments (excluding maintenance expenditures)
must increase from current levels of 0.7 percent of GDP to 1.1 percent by 2032
(High Powered Expert Committee 2011). The policy questions that
governments in developing countries must answer are: Which level of
government will deliver this infrastructure? With what degree of autonomy?
How will it be financed?
For large urban areas, heavy infrastructure demands will come from three
directions.
• First, natural population growth and new migrants impose demands for
expanding, repairing, and modernizing capital facilities to
accommodate the larger population.
• Second, industry and businesses, especially in the high-technology
sector, demand infrastructure that will enable them to compete in the
international marketplace. Transportation and information technology
support feature prominently in their investment wish list.
• Third, it is expected that there will be about 2 billion slum dwellers in
urban areas by 2050 (United Nations 2008) and services to provide a
basic standard of living for these urban residents will be needed.
23. For a good discussion of the symmetry-asymmetry issue in the South African context,
see Schroeder (2003).
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Efficiency considerations might point toward decentralization in the provision
of services in metropolitan areas. Governments in metropolitan areas have the
advantage of knowing the needs and preferences of their population and
businesses. But decentralizing expenditure responsibility to metropolitan areas is
one thing; decentralizing to local governments within the metropolitan area may
be quite another. The local units within the metropolitan areas may not be large
enough to efficiently deliver infrastructure services. The underlying problem is the
fragmentation of governance within large urban areas (Bahl 2013).
Local government structures in metropolitan areas typically emphasize one of
three approaches to governance.
• A political fragmentation approach: governance is divided among
numerous small municipalities, each operating with some degree of
autonomy. This approach, which features home rule, is the one taken in
the Mexico City metropolitan area (two states, a national capital
district, and over 50 municipal-type local governments), and the Sao
Paulo metropolitan area (39 municipal governments operating with
relatively little required coordination).
• A functional fragmentation approach: the municipal government
structure is overlaid by some special districts or public enterprises that
provide infrastructure services to the entire metropolitan area. The
emphasis here is on technical efficiency in the delivery of infrastructure
services. Such an approach is taken in Mumbai, with state-owned
parastatals serving as the metropolitan-area enterprises.
• A metropolitan government approach: general services are provided by
an area-wide government with little by way of local governments. The
emphasis of this approach is on coordination in the delivery of services
in the area. This would describe the approach taken in South African
metropolitan cities.
In the case of a politically fragmented government structure, the devolution of
responsibility for infrastructure services does not lead to efficient outcomes.
Jurisdictions are often too small to capture the economies of scale necessary for
production efficiency and management skills may be limited. Further, the more
fragmented the structure of government, the greater the problems with spillover
effects from local investments in infrastructure. Finally, local governments in
fragmented metropolitan areas seldom have broad-based taxing powers that would
provide the basis for supporting a large debt issue.
If there is to be assignment of responsibilities for infrastructure services to
subnational governments in urban areas, and if there are to be broad-based taxes
in the system, the better approach would be either a metropolitan government or
public enterprises whose service district includes the entire metropolitan area. On
the other hand, within this general framework there may be ample scope for
“neighbourhood” (or small municipality) works to be developed (and largely
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financed) by user-based groups through schemes capturing the value increments
generated by such projects.
Remote localities
Rural local governments also call for different treatment. They are small, often
remote, and have very limited resources. The literacy rate may be low, financial
management capacity of the local governments may be limited, and there may be
little capacity to design or deliver anything beyond the most basic infrastructure
project. Own-source revenues may be all but non-existent because of the weak tax
base, and user charges well below cost-recovery levels because of residents’ poverty.
China is one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in the world. Despite
the rapid out-migration of recent decades, however, more than 600 million people
still live in about 700,000 rural villages, many of which are in remote and sparsely
populated areas. For these villages (and the townships in which they are situated)
to become more viable, accountable, and at least moderately effective in providing
basic public services, significant efforts and reforms are needed. Similarly, in India,
another huge country with a large rural population, experience to date suggests
that neither centralized provision of rural services nor more decentralized
provision has worked very well. While generalizations are dangerous in either of
these huge and heterogeneous countries, rural service delivery remains a problem
and a very different one from that in the metropolitan areas.
One part of the solution to both problems is similar, however. In metropolitan
areas, some kind of region-wide authority is needed to deal with area-wide
infrastructure problems. In rural areas also, some kind of higher-level “regional”
authority is also often needed, though not because of spillovers, since there are few
such problems in small, geographically separated localities. Rather, the need is for
technical, administrative, and financial support to provide basic local services in
remote, small, and usually very poor communities.24 For example, small remote
communities are unlikely to have an adequate tax base to be economically viable,
to have adequate administrative capacity, to finance major capital expenditures, or
even to take advantage of economies of scale (Kitchen and Slack 2006).
In these circumstances, infrastructure investments required to provide basic
local public services must either be provided directly by a higher-level government
or at least financed (with perhaps some limited in-kind or other local cost-sharing)
by such a regional structure, whether a county, a second-tier municipality, or some
kind of special district.

4.2 Regional equity
In the devolution of expenditure responsibility for infrastructure services,
efficiency is not the only consideration. Fiscal disparities among regions in
developing countries can be quite large, and the quality of infrastructure is usually
24. In some instances, the economically most efficient course of action might be to move
people to some other area, but this is seldom politically possible and, at least in the case of
border regions, not even politically desirable.
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most wanting in the poorest places. A national infrastructure decentralization
policy will, if anything, widen fiscal disparities because of the greater revenue
mobilization capacity of richer jurisdictions and their superior capacity to deliver
services. In addition, as Albalate, Bel, and Fageda (2012) show in detail for Spain,
and as many “provincials” suspect is true in countries everywhere, centralized
investment programs (e.g., in network projects) tend to be heavily related to
proximity to the political capital city. Although infrastructure investment is more
an instrument of centralization than of regional redistribution policy, it is
nonetheless also commonly a vehicle for “regional policy” in the sense of providing
“something for everyone” and perhaps even more for those who have less.
There are two main views about decentralized infrastructure responsibility in
this context. One is that the ability to choose capital projects and to deliver them
is just as important in small communities as it is in large urban areas. Devolution
can work. There is evidence that in some cases, small local governments can
produce small (local) public works projects at a lower cost and design them so that
the probability of sustainable operations is relatively high.25 The problem is
financing. In this case, decentralization with financing by intergovernmental
transfers for smaller projects and vertical programs for the delivery of larger
projects may be a viable strategy.
On the other hand, much of the evidence on successful devolution of
infrastructure is about small settlements, including rural ones. There are questions
about the how much of this success can be transferred to larger settlements or even
to the rural sector more broadly. If not, infrastructure disparities may widen under
devolution. In this case, the right strategy may be an asymmetric system in which
larger urban places have heavy responsibility for delivering and financing their
infrastructure, with infrastructure in smaller, less dense, and often poorer localities
being delivered primarily by higher-level governments.
5. Conclusions and Guidelines for Policy
Theory tells us that an appropriately structured fiscal decentralization can lead to
a higher quality of infrastructure services than will a fully centralized system. If the
assignment of expenditure responsibility is correct and if the capacity to deliver
services is in place, consumer-voters will be empowered to express their
preferences for infrastructure services, services will be delivered with appropriate
technologies and at lower costs, and there will be more willingness to pay and a
better record of maintenance of public facilities.
Following the theory can indeed lead to some of these outcomes. But there is
also plenty of evidence that a decentralized infrastructure structure fails the quality
test. The problem is that the theory is based on a set of assumptions that may not
apply to developing countries, and that successful infrastructure decentralization
requires changes in the supporting governance and finance system that most
developing countries are not willing (or able) to make. However, from this theory,
25. See, for example, the review of the evidence in Peterson and Muzzini (2005).
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and from the practice in developing countries, we might draw out some policy
rules to support successful decentralization of appropriate infrastructure services.
This review of the theory and the practice suggests six policy reform areas issues
that can lead to more success in the delivery of some infrastructure services by
local governments.
First, there is the need for comprehensive infrastructure policy reform.
Reformers should take a broad view of infrastructure decentralization and should
consider and fit together all the components necessary to make the system work.
The argument for local control depends not only on beneficiaries being local, but
also on local control being more likely to meet local needs and, ideally, on local
users’ ability and willingness to pay the costs. Only when local governance
institutions ensure in an accountable way that those who benefit and pay are also
those who decide what is done can all aspects of infrastructure decisions be
assigned to local governments. A corollary is the importance of getting the
structure right in order to benefit from management improvements. Improved
procurement and financial management systems and the like will not achieve their
goals if the responsibility for capital expenditure is assigned to the wrong level of
government.
Second, a clear and appropriate assignment of expenditure responsibility for
infrastructure is required. Public-sector functions must be sufficiently unbundled
to ensure that they are assigned to the correct levels of government: both who is
responsible for what and who is accountable to whom for what must be clearly
delineated. While unbundling can be a decided improvement in that it recognizes
the comparative advantages of each level of government in infrastructure service
delivery, it can lead to complication and confusion and must be reviewed regularly.
Clarity in assignment must be matched by accountability, in terms of both political
democracy and transparency of operation, as well as by authority in terms of both
the ability to manage expenditures and to determine (within limits) revenues.
Third, local governments must be adequately accountable in political,
administrative, and financial terms both to those whom they are supposed to
serve—their residents—as well as to those above them in the governmental
hierarchy who may be responsible for developing policy, regulating how it is
carried out, and often financing the activities of lower-level governments. Such
“dual accountability” is neither easy to design nor to implement, and requires fiscal
planners to walk a fine line. On the one hand, unbundling schemes (such as
allowing higher-level governments to set standards and require creditable
compliance tests) call for upward accountability by local governments. So do
conditional grants. On the other, too much expenditure-mandating by higher-level
governments can take away the local autonomy that is the key advantage of fiscal
decentralization of infrastructure. Ultimately, the local government must be
accountable to its voting constituency. Mandates and conditions should be held to
the test of accommodating externalities.
Fourth, the revenue mobilization efforts of local governments in most
developing countries needs to be increased if local governments are to take on
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more responsibility for delivering infrastructure services. In particular, the larger
urban local governments need to be given access to stronger tax bases and
encouragement to reform the tax base to which they already have access (namely
the property tax). User charges must be ratcheted up significantly so that they
approach cost-recovery levels. Arguably, the major impediment to increased
revenue mobilization by local governments is the absence of incentives that are
sufficiently large to offset the aversion of local politicians to tax increases. Here the
reform agenda might include closing off the option of ad hoc capital transfers to
cover infrastructure financing by local governments, the provision of incentives for
increased local effort, and conditional grants that combine clearly specified
conditions and local matches.
Fifth, borrowing and public-private partnerships have great potential as
methods of financing capital projects, and in the latter case as a managerial
approach to operations. However, governments in developing countries must be
more realistic about the prospects of reaching either of these sources for efficiently
financing local government infrastructure. Borrowing, even under a reasonable
regulatory framework, can be part of the long-term infrastructure finance plan for
local governments, but only if this is supported by a level of local revenue
mobilization and transfers that will make principal and interest repayment as well
as maintenance viable. Public-private partnerships are even more problematic for
developing countries. For revenue-generating projects for which the user-charge
phobia of local governments is not so great (e.g., telecoms, parking, etc.), private
capital can be drawn. But for the high-priority services such as water and sewer,
private investors will probably not buy in until they see a reasonable prospect for
cost recovery and for operations that are not hamstrung by the regulatory
framework.
Sixth, there is a strong case for an asymmetric approach to decentralizing
infrastructure delivery and finance. The larger urban areas have a greater capacity
to plan, deliver, and finance infrastructure services than do smaller and more rural
local governments. The regime for infrastructure decentralization should recognize
these differences, perhaps by limiting local government participation until local
governments grow into the responsibility. Such a guideline would lead to more
responsibility for delivering infrastructure in larger urban areas, as well as more
responsibility for financing infrastructure with own-source revenues. Rural local
governments will continue to rely more heavily on vertical programs of higherlevel governments. This reliance may harm the equalization objectives of
government, and it may slow down the capacity development of rural local
governments, but it also may increase the productivity of total infrastructure
spending.
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